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Yudin: The Neoliberal Roots of Putin’s War

Vladimir Putin’s decision to invade Ukraine and the ensuing war came
unexpectedly to the majority of experts and pundits in various countries,
immediately revealing deficiencies in the established thinking on a range of
subjects, from Russian politics to the current state of the global order. Scholars in
fields like international relations and comparative politics tended to underestimate
the likelihood of a full-fledged war, insisting that rational cost-benefit analysis
would obviously tell Putin not to start it. When they were proved wrong, many
conveniently found refuge in the idea that Putin’s eventual decision was irrational
and therefore not subject to reasonable comprehension.
One common mistake behind almost all these wrong predictions was to
assume that before the war Putin was contemplating two particular options,
comparing the possible benefits of invasion with the status quo. The outcome of
such a comparison seemed quite straightforward, which should have been enough
to dissuade the Russian President, who was enjoying a stable economic and
political situation, from engaging in a highly risky adventure. In fact, Putin was
likely weighing the consequences of an invasion against the costs of inaction – of
what he believed to be the inevitable development of the political situation in the
coming years. This calculation made him believe that inaction would put him in
existential jeopardy, and he seized the last opportunity to avert a bitter future.
To take stock of this logic and understand the reasoning that made the war
inevitable, I suggest looking at the political regime built in Russia as a radical
version of neoliberalism. Arguably, this perspective not only helps to explain and,
to a certain degree, foresee actions driven by the inherent logic of the Russian
state, but also enables one to see the political challenges and openings that
emerge from this major political-military catastrophe.
There is a voluminous literature proposing various definitions of
neoliberalism, and, as both opponents and apologists of the concept increasingly
tend to admit, the meaning of the word is now stretched so thin as to make it
almost useless. For the present purposes, however, I shall rely on an early
approach to studying neoliberalism suggested by Michel Foucault. Rather than
focusing on the privatization of social welfare, which would become the key theme
in many later criticisms of neoliberalism (Harvey 2005), Foucault emphasizes the
inherent logic of neoliberal rule. Contrary to earlier liberal patterns of governance,
neoliberalism is deeply distrustful of the idea of the market as a natural order and
therefore invests energy in producing, artificially, market-like interactions between
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isolated individuals; imposing a utilitarian and individualistic common sense on
those individuals; and forcing them to engage in cutthroat competition, which is
ostensibly the most economically beneficial model 1.
Economic efficiency, as measured by GDP growth, is the goal of neoliberal
governmentality and the measure through which the truth of its underlying model
is ascertained. This is achieved through the consistent prioritization of the
economic over the political, through a technocratic-administrative manner of
governing subjects who are thoroughly depoliticized by the utter uselessness of
collective action. As Wendy Brown (2015: 39) puts it, “the foundation vanishes for
citizenship concerned with public things and the common good. Here, the problem
is not just that public goods are defunded and common ends are devalued by
neoliberal reason, although this is so, but that citizenship itself loses its political
valence and venue”. On the one hand, neoliberal common sense makes striving
for collective goals laughable, for neoliberal ontology denies the reality of anything
beyond the self-interest of individuals. On the other hand, the state promotes
individualization by suppressing collective self-organization and thus by making
membership in such organizations not only senseless but also dangerous – or, to
put it in economic terms, costly and excessively risky2.
Economic knowledge gains the upper hand in these settings, for the market
functions as a “site of veridiction”, proving the obvious advantage of escaping from
politics by increasing generated wealth. Quite naturally, the preexisting inequality
is justified and magnified, wealth is distributed highly unevenly, and neoliberalism
brings about unprecedented inequality both globally and within many nations. The
rejection of the idea of inclusive, collective well-being results in the prosperity of a
small elite of winners in the competition game who renounce responsibility for the
less successful, for the latter are themselves to blame for their losses, according
to the deeply individualistic and aggressive neoliberal morality.

1

“For what in fact is competition? It is absolutely not a given of nature. The game, mechanisms,
and effects of competition which we identify and enhance are not at all natural phenomena;
competition is not the result of a natural interplay of appetites, instincts, behavior, and so on … The
market, or rather pure competition, which is the essence of the market, can only appear if it is
produced, and if it is produced by an active governmentality.” (Foucault 2008: 120-1)
2

For instance, in Russia actual trade unions resisting the employer are almost non-existent, apart
from a dozen factories. All other organizations have so-called official (“yellow”) unions, supervised
by the state, which closely cooperate with employers in repressing the workers and restrict
themselves to distributing vacation tours.
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While Foucault anticipated the global rise of neoliberal politics, the textbook
case of neoliberalism at that time was perhaps the regime of Augusto Pinochet in
Chile, which was built on a crassly autocratic rule that repressed all political
participation but promoted economic growth under the auspices of the “Chicago
boys”. It could be argued that the ensuing triumph of neoliberalism was most
impressive in the places that had no strong legacy of political solidarity to contain
it. While currently neoliberal policies are common sense in many parts of Europe
and North America, there is still a residual political culture there that challenges
the most brutal and inhuman versions of neoliberalism. The idea that society is
nothing but a war of all against all, where only the fittest survive, is more likely to
succeed in highly atomized societies permeated by distrust.
These conditions applied perfectly in Russia. After the devastating crash of
the Soviet regime, the country was taken over by a group of neoliberals who
managed to institute profound mutual hostility and suspicion and openly stated
that everyone was responsible for her own survival amidst the economic
desperation of the early 1990s. This resulted in the collapse of interpersonal
bonds within Russian society, and the country is among those with the lowest
levels of generalized trust of other people in the world. Surveys consistently find
Russia to be an extremely individualistic society with a deep aversion to collective
action3.
Vladimir Putin was quite skillful in transforming these conditions into a type
of governmentality embodying all the key principles of neoliberalism. His economic
policy remains the continuation of the monetarist policies of the early nineties,
supervised by literally the same people – the current Head of the Russian Central
Bank and architect of Putin’s economic system, Elvira Nabiullina, belongs to a
small group of staunchly neoliberal economists that promoted the shock reforms

3

“The average Russian today is more strongly committed than residents of most European
countries to the values of wealth and power, and also personal success and social recognition. A
strong orientation to personal self-enhancement leaves less space in his or her consciousness for
concern about equality and justice in the country and the world, tolerance, nature, and the
environment, and even for worry and concern about their immediate milieu” (Magun, Rudnev 2012:
41).
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of the early 1990s4. This continuity helped Putin to achieve significant economic
results and deliver economic growth during his first period in power, and
impressive economic resilience after that, when he confronted foreign economic
sanctions5.
This success was made possible by a strict separation of the economy from
politics. Putin started making strategic use of the disappointment of the masses in
politics, carefully depoliticizing Russia and suppressing all kinds of political
engagement. Putin’s economic technocrats quickly and comfortably renounced
their right to challenge the political power of the autocratic leader in exchange for
the chance to participate in expanding the market economy throughout society.
The masses, too, gladly adopted a scorn for politics and learned to value material
well-being above all, rejoicing at the new opportunities provided by consumer
culture6. The social-Darwinist view of politics became deeply entrenched,
discrediting political imagination in general and making all attempts to make
society more just, fair, equal, or democratic look naïve and childish. As Putin
himself put it in 2021 after meeting the US President Joe Biden, “there is no
happiness in the world”7. This bleak, nihilist, and resentful vision of the world
became common sense in present-day Russia.
Quite predictably, monetarist economic policies resulted in a highly stratified
trickle-down economy and exceptionally high levels of inequality. Russia under
Putin caught up with the US in terms of economic inequality (Novokmet, Piketty,
Zucman 2018). The country has a thin layer of ultra-rich people and is one of the

4

The reforms were predicated on a strong belief in the power of the free market, competition, and
entrepreneurship that was supposed to create a market equilibrium after a period of painful
adjustment. Naomi Klein’s (2007) highly partisan but nevertheless useful account of Chicago-style
neoliberal reforms in Russia traces how hopes for the coming of a “Russian Pinochet” traveled
from the West to Russia and back since the late eighties and animated the rise of neoliberal
economists who would retain control over the economy in the government for next three decades.
5

Russian GDP enjoyed an average 4.7% annual growth in 2000-2014. The growth rate fell to 1.0%
in 2015-2021 after sanctions were imposed following the annexation of Crimea.
6

Consumer credit and mortgages became the main aspiration for the vast majority of the
population. According to the Russian Central Bank, consumer loans rose by more than 1200% in
2005-2018.
7

‘Putin says everything is US's fault... and there is no happiness in the world’ Independent. Jun 17,
2021. The quote was attributed by Putin to Leo Tolstoy, which is disputable. Putin’s remark echoes
Giovanni Gentile’s assertion in The Doctrine of Fascism that fascism “does not believe in the
possibility of ‘happiness’ on earth”. The shared motive here is that the world appears as endless
struggle.
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global leaders in the number of billionaires, and the wealth of the masses is rising
very slowly, even though most of the population is better off under Putin. Putin’s
Russia is one of the very few countries in the world that have a flat tax rate, which
sends inequality indicators through the roof. This, in turn, leads to the rapid growth
of consumer credit, for taking a loan is usually the only way for the masses to
catch up, at least partially, with the attractive lifestyle of the elites. An ever-growing
share of the population lives in precarity with no labor guarantees, high
dependence on their bosses (particularly in the public sector), and very limited
paths for upward mobility8.
While the Russian economic model may seem at first sight to defy the label
of neoliberalism because of the public education and health-care provisions
carried over from the Soviet times, these are mostly façade similarities9. Higher
education is in theory free, but families must invest heavily in additional training for
their children to give them a chance to pass the unified test before entering
university. The less successful applicants must pay to be admitted, and the
amount of the payment often depends on their performance, creating a significant
strain on household finances and an atmosphere of aggressive competition within
universities. At the same time, neoliberal reforms in health and education resulted
in a situation where teachers, professors, and doctors earn only a small part of
their salary in fixed payments and are dependent on arbitrary performance criteria
for the rest, which makes them particularly vulnerable and dependent. The
downsizing of hospitals and schools leads to huge markets for informal services,
particularly for severe illnesses – for instance, the treatment of cancer is more or
less limited to a handful of medical centers in Moscow and Saint-Petersburg.
How does the Russian neoliberal regime translate into foreign policy?
Putin’s formidable success in exploiting the neoliberal model was extended
beyond Russian borders and was warmly received among foreign elites. Insisting
on a strict separation of economy and politics, Putin struck favorable deals with

8

This, in turn, helps in targeted recruiting during the wartime. Among Russian soldiers, the less
affluent regions and strata are highly overrepresented, for going to the frontlines provides a unique
chance of upward mobility and meaning in life. In Russia, it is a war waged by the hopeless and
the resentful.
9

On the Russian political-economic model, see: (Matveev 2019).
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big companies around the world10 and led governments to disregard basic national
security interests, as happened with German chancellor Angela Merkel, who
stubbornly insisted on the non-political nature of the gas trade with Russia even as
the country grew heavily dependent on Russian energy. Offering foreign CEOs
lucrative deals and positions in Russian companies, Putin was able to seduce an
impressive portion of global elites. At the same time, he and his cronies were able
to become part of these elites, exhibiting a provocatively luxurious lifestyle and
buying entry into the inner clubs in the West. For big capital all over the world,
Putin became the embodiment of the logic of enrichment, a relentless provider of
business opportunities for all those who don’t mess things up with him politically
(much in the way he demands from the Russian population). It is no wonder that
significant parts of the political and financial class in Britain, Germany, or Austria
were willing to close their eyes to Putin’s political strategy, preferring to focus on
their self-interest. There is no doubt that Putin’s money contributed significantly
not only to widespread corruption in Europe, but also to the rise of inequality over
the last two decades.
At the same time, Putin’s Hobbesian view of the world as filled with violent
unbridled competition between individuals struggling for their existence engenders
a permanent and acute sense of danger. Putin’s deep fear of revolutions and his
disgust for the very idea of revolutionary change creates a profound feeling of
insecurity that he successfully projects onto a significant part of the Russian
population. From this viewpoint, the ruler should have enough resources at his
disposal to suppress brutally any attempt at social change. It is well known that
the murder of Colonel Gaddafi by Libyan rebels in 2011, after the no-fly zone was
imposed over the country following the start of revolution, had a long-lasting,
unsettling effect on Putin.
Within this logic, the existence of an independent and culturally close country like
Ukraine nearby creates a situation of mortal threat. Since Ukraine was irrevocably
sliding into a military alliance with the United States even without the NATO
membership, it should have been obvious to Putin that an unwillingness to stop
10

While energy giants like Shell, Total, or Ruhrgas are most often invoked in the context of
cementing European energy dependence from Russia, other industries provide even more striking
examples. For instance, big tech leaders like Google and Apple are now known to have bowed to
Putin’s blackmail and agreed to act against his political opponents, with Google even silencing a
kidnapping attempt of its CEO by Russian secret services in September 2021. Nokia has now
been revealed to assist Russian secret services in building an advanced surveillance system
widely used to spy on Russian opposition.
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this slide would have resulted in a potential stronghold for his enemies right by his
side. As the domestic audience, particularly the younger generations, was
increasingly becoming tired of Putin11, a rebellion in Russia seemed almost
inevitable in the coming years, much like it happened in 2020 in Belarus, a country
that shares with Russia much of its political culture. Ukraine was about to become
a stronghold for Putin’s opponents, a possible bridgehead for an intervention that
would have prevented him from crushing the uprising. As Putin himself stated
many times, he does not recognize the possibility of the existence of an internal
opposition that would object to his rule – in a Schmittian way, opposition is
believed to be necessarily external, consisting of enemies and traitors. The
neoliberal idea of depoliticization logically results in the denial of pluralism in
domestic politics and the identification of political opponents with military targets to
be destroyed.
One should recognize that despite the now popular description of Putin’s
invasion as a severe miscalculation or a triumph of emotions over economic
rationality, there is a strong economic reasoning behind it. Much as Putin
managed to annex Crimea in 2014 and thereby significantly enrich his oligarchs
(despite many of them panicking at first about the consequences of this arrogant
takeover), he now aims to attain similar goals by annexing the next chunks of
Ukraine12. Putin did not sacrifice economic interest for geopolitical goals; he rather
firmly believes that territorial expansion will be tolerated by global elites, in the
final reckoning, and will result in an increase of his economic might. Russia’s
neoliberal environment teaches the lesson that economic gains are always made
by force, and this is the logic that Putin is likely to deploy in his foreign
undertakings.

11

While polling numbers should be approached very carefully, the percentage of people invoking
Putin when asked about the politicians to trust fell from 70% to 25% between 2015-2020.
12

Emphasis on Putin’s defensive mindset shouldn’t obfuscate the attractiveness of Ukraine as an
extremely resource-rich country. The 2014 annexation of Crimea resulted in Putin’s oligarchs
acquiring for little compensation many of Crimea’s resources: many lands, including famous
vineyards, ended up in the hands of Yuri Kovalchuk; the tourist industry is now controlled by
Arkady Rotenberg; while Sergey Aksenov owns much of the construction industry. Ukraine is the
second largest country in Europe after Russia, with a huge, if somewhat outdated military and
industrial complex (for instance, its steel and energy production capacities were partly captured by
the Russian army during the current invasion), fertile lands (Russia expects to overtake Ukraine as
chief grain exporter), and a large population. Extraction is among the most significant goals of this
land grab.
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With this perspective in mind, it would be wrong to assume that Putin’s war
plans are limited to Ukraine, let alone its Eastern part. For the Russian military
leadership, this is the opening phase of an existential war against the West, a war
over resources and global hegemony. While the current conflict has often been
correctly characterized as an imperial war, this view emphasizes competition
between empires and disregards those with experience of colonial oppression
(Smoleński, Dutkiewicz 2022). For Eastern Europeans (Ukrainians, Belarussians,
Poles, and many other peoples) this is resistance to an imminent imperial
takeover. As the ultimatum announced by Putin in December 2021 suggests, the
whole territory of the former Warsaw pact is believed to be illegitimately controlled
by NATO forces. Putin’s neoliberal and aggressive view certainly does not accept
any neutrality and therefore lays claim to the former Soviet satellite states –
something these states understand fairly well. For these Eastern European
nations, this is not a war in which they pick one empire over another, but a
struggle for their own sovereign existence.
The ongoing war has already produced a less than inspiring debate
between the Western left and the Eastern left over whose imperialism is worse.
While there is no correct answer to this question, one has to remember that it is
the Eastern territories that are now being brutally attacked, and therefore the
inhabitants of these territories should know better – at least, if one sticks to the
belief that the popular will matters. The Eastern European left has been almost
unanimous in supporting Ukraine, going so far as to produce joint statements by
Ukrainians and Russians13. This consensus is not shaken by the shared and
legitimate concern that Ukrainian emancipation presently assumes a nationalist
guise. A war that is waged in a nineteenth-century style probably deserves a
nineteenth-century solution. As Karl Marx repeatedly pointed out, national

13 Against

Russian Imperialism – by Russian Socialist Movement & Sotsialnyi Rukh. LeftEast.
URL: <https://lefteast.org/against-russian-imperialism/>
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liberation movements should be supported in their struggle against imperialism,
for this is a logically necessary stage of emancipation14.
Unless Ukraine keeps its sovereignty, the left in Ukraine simply has no
chance to promote a more progressive approach to emancipation15 – just like the
Russian and Belarussian left have none under Putin’s rule. In addition, such
sovereignty is also the only possible path to Russia’s own liberation from its
neoliberal imperial rulers and its transformation into a progressive society that
would cherish the real achievements of the Socialist revolution.
In other words, Ukraine’s existential struggle for independence and selfdetermination should be supported not because Western imperialism is preferable
to Russian imperialism but because the anti-imperialist resistance of the Eastern
European nations is valuable in itself. The attempts by the American government
to subjugate Cuba in the mid-twentieth century faced resistance not because they
originated in the United States but because they were colonial. Imperialism
should be confronted where it arises, and not because of the imperial camps
previously chosen.
More importantly, this war is not so much a collision of two imperial powers
as it is a war waged by capital unchained. Putin’s successful experience of
building a neoliberal state and corrupting global elites made him consider brute
force as the ultimate political argument. The attractiveness of this view in the
present-day world should not be underestimated.

14

“Firstly, of course, sympathy for a subjugated people, which by continuous heroic struggle

against its oppressors has proved its historic right to national independence and selfdetermination. It is by no means a contradiction that the international Working Men's Party should
strive for the restoration of the Polish nation. On the contrary: only when Poland has re-conquered
its independence, when it once again exercises control over itself as a free people, only then can
its internal development recommence and will it be able to take part in its own right in the social
transformation of Europe. As long as a viable people is fettered by a foreign conqueror, it must
necessarily apply all its strength, all its efforts, all its energy against the enemy from without; for
this length of time, then, its inner life remains paralysed, it remains unable to work for social
emancipation. Ireland, Russia under Mongolian rule, etc., provide striking proof of this thesis.”
(Marx, Engels 2010: 57)
15

Marx’s vision would later inform Lenin’s eventual position in favor of Ukrainian sovereignty to
avoid mistrust on the side of Ukrainians, which he considered legitimate for the obvious reason
that “the Great Russians, under the yoke of the landowners and capitalists, had for centuries
imbibed the shameful and disgusting prejudices of Great-Russian chauvinism” (Lenin 1965: 295). It
is no wonder that Vladimir Putin started the 2022 invasion with lashing out ferociously on Vladimir
Lenin as a “creator of the Ukrainian state”. What irritates Putin here is precisely Lenin’s
attentiveness to Ukraine’s painful experience: in this remake of the events of 1919, Putin clearly
positions himself on the side of Great-Russian capitalists and imperialists.
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However, the present conflict also opens up a number of political
opportunities for the left. In many countries, it has exposed the recklessness and
hypocrisy of the super-rich, who were willing to trade the basic security of their
nations for lucrative deals with Putin, leaving whole countries vulnerable to
blackmail and condemning populations to prohibitive energy prices, decreasing
living standards, and migration crises. The betrayal of national interests by the
elites finally provides legitimacy to the demands for popular control over wealth.
The pervasive corruption of European institutions brought about by Putin would
have been impossible without a complete lack of accountability for the rich. It is
only now that the UK is slowly revoking the residence permits for Russian
oligarchs, even though it was crystal clear for decades how they earn their money
and how this money served to support Putin’s regime. It is only now that global
high-tech giants like Google are refusing to comply with the demands of Putin’s
government – even though it has always been crystal clear that these demands
are needed to terrorize the Russian opposition. As Thomas Piketty (2022) rightly
points out, Putin’s war makes obvious the urgency of creating national and
international registries for popular oversight over the property of the super-rich.
This woeful war will generate millions of victims – from, most obviously, the
killed, wounded and displaced Ukrainians, to the imprisoned and exiled
Belarussians and Russians, to the impoverished Estonians, Slovaks, Germans, or
Italians who will be struggling with higher prices and decreasing quality of life. In
this situation of massive suffering, pain and sorrow, only an international political
coalition could prevent these desperate peoples from entering an even more
calamitous conflict. The challenge for the left now would be to prevent the world
from slipping further into the abyss of unbridled neoliberalism, riddled by extreme
inequality, resentment and atomization. The world should never resemble Putin’s
Russia – and that is already a temptation to resist.
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